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ANGLO -ECYPTfAN
SUDAN
UGANDA
TANGANYIKA
PORTUGUESE
ANGOLA
BELGIAN AFRICA’S TOTAL WAR
BOOK
PRODUCTION
WAR ECONOMY
STANDARD
1
THE TYPOGRAPHY AND BINDING
OF THIS BOOK CONFORMS TO THE
AUTHORIZED ECONOMY STANDARDS
Published by Evans Brothers Ltd.^
Montague House, Russell Square, London, W.C.i
Printed in Great Britain by
Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ltd., London and Aylesbury
■ III'. WICALTH OF CENTRAL AFRICA, CONTROLLED BY THE BELGIAN
GOVERNMENT IN LONDON
BELGIAN AFRICA’S
TOTAL WAR
by
WALTER FORD
M
with a Foreword by
THE RT. HON. THE VISCOUNT CRANBORNE
Lord Privy Seal, lately Secretary of State
for the Colonies
15 1943
I
■3
PUBLISHED FOR
THE BELGIAN INFORMATION OFFICE
25, Eaton Place, London, S.W.i
BY
EVANS BROTHERS LIMITED, LONDON
The Belgian Congo, showing chief resources. Inset: Belgium on the same scale.
CONTENTS
Economic Effort
controUed from London .'
f “ AUied War Effort .
Tho A Economic Co-operation
Pnrph^i?i A^^® (January 1941)
Purchase Agreement of June 194s ; Growing Importance of Congo Supplies
Military Effort . .
Military Agreement . ! | ]
The Belgian Campaign in Abyssinia
Well-equipped Congo Force stands Ready
Financial Effort (see also p. ii)
Fighter Funds and War Relief Fund !
America Joins In ,
History Repeats Itself : A Stout Ally in 1914 and 1941
'^“^j^ongo’s Resources and their Use in War
Copper .!*’’■
Tire Chre and Tin . ‘ ’
Tungsten (or Wolfram) Ore*; Rubber .*
Cotton ; Copal ....
Ground-nuts ; Palm Kernels and Palm Oil
Sugar • • . . .
Coffee ; Jute Substitutes . . ’
‘^°Sra^°°"'’'^”°’' Anglo-Beloian Agreements
Diamonds . . ! ’ '
Manganese . . ’ * ’ ‘
Lead ; Zinc
Palladium ; Radio-active Ores ; Platinum
Silver ; Rare-earth Metals . .
Non-mining Industries . * ’ ’
Animal and Vegetable Wealth .*
Congo Co-operation with South Africa
PoTENTi^ Resources of the Congo in a Long War
S elf-sufficiency in Food . .
Real Silk ; Quinine . . ’
Soya ; Tung Oil ; Graphite '
General Economic Trends
S tate Regulation of Trade and Industry
Government Control of Quality
Produce Offices ...
Produce Comrai^ions : Prici-fixing anci Control of' Exports
Labour Legislation : Key Men must remain at their Posts
Conclusion: Total War
ma» . 1 ■ ^ diagrams
Belgium on the
14
16
16
16
17
18
18
same scale ....
The Moulding Tide of Congo Supplies
How the Belgian Congo equips Britain for War
Frontispiece
13
28
:xi
7G(^) .^5
•Fe
FOREWORD
The story of the contribution of the peoples of the Colonial
Empire of Belgium in the time of her most grievous adversity
is not only a refutation of those who, in ignorance of the
facts, or even in spite of them, assert that there is something
inferior about colonial status. It is an inspiration to those
nations who, like ourselves, should be more properly
described as blessed with the privilege of colonial responsi-
bilities.
Nothing has been more remarkable in the present World
War than the unbroken record of fidelity of the various
colonies of the Allied Nations to their mother-countries.
It must, indeed, have been a sad disappointment to the
dictators to find that the further their plans of aggression
appeared to be proceeding on the road of success, the more
resolute did the colonies of the free nations of Europe now
temporarily under their heel become in the support of their
oppressed mother-countries.
The Colonial Empires of the 20th century are as far in
advance of those of the 19th as were those of the 19th in
front of the Colonial Empires of the i8th and earlier
centuries. Rule by conquest for exploitation has long since
ceased to be traceable in 20th century colonial enterprise.
To-day the freedom loving peoples of the colonies of the
free and Allied Nations are fighting Hitler and Hitlerism
because they know that their own liberties depend upon
the survival of the liberties of their mother-countries. They
are our partners in a struggle for freedom of which the
colonial link is a guarantee and an assurance, and their
unswerving loyalty is the proof that they are fully conscious
of this essential fact.
Our Belgian friends and allies have something to tell the
world in which they may well feel a legitimate pride.
5
I •• I I i M :i I .1 1 r ) I
'1 :i I / I ! . »■ «. I I ( A w
'54357S ‘
Belgian Africa has not been caUed upon to endure, and
we hope It will never be called upon to endure the miseries
of foreign occupation. But it is making, as this most
interesting and valuable book shows, a vL cont^LTon
he final victory. It has become one of the storehouses
and arsenals of democracy. From the copper, tin and
many other raw materials of the Congo, are being forged
the weapons for the liberation of the Mother Country and
all other oppressed peoples; her foodstuffs are helping to
sustain the United Nations in their hour of trial; they will
pour out in a great mass to feed Europe when Eurime is
m w""' ^tand shoulder
Belgl™
Cranborne.
(
6
>. i i f I : ; I : , . , :
V >. / ) I i . I I - \ I 1 II
ECONOMIC EFFORT
Wealth of the Congo controlled from London
Though the whole of Belgium is at present in the hands of
the enemy, the Belgian Government in London still com-
mands all the wealth of a region eighty times more extensive
than the mother-country, comprising a twelfth of the
African continent.
The Belgian Congo, rich in mines, forests, plantations, and
animal life, exported goods to the value of 2,487 million
francs (^17 million) in 1937, 1,897 million (£13 million) in
1938, and 1,732 million (again £13 million at the higher rate
of exchange then ruling) in 1939.
The vast resources of this area have been placed un-
reservedly at the disposal of the Allied war effort. Every-
thing is being done to raise the output of strategic materials,
and with great success, as will be described in detail later.
In particular the production of tin, cotton, and industrial
diamonds rises continually.
Unique Difficulties Surmounted
The ingenuity expended and the immense difficulties
overcome to achieve this are not easily realised.
The old familiar problems that confronted European and
American countries under the impact of war struck at the
Congo too, but there they came in a fantastically enhanced
'form, luxuriating as it were in that tropic zone like the
English rabbit nuisance suddenly became a vast menace
under the Australian sun.
England had to reduce imports of luxuries and non-
essentials gradually, in order to save shipping space and
foreign currency; but about half of the Congo's imports were cut
off at one stroke in the overwhelming days of the loth to
7
I •
England had to adjust
themselves to the loss of valuable markets in Germany at
with th? ?ir f country and another ; but
™ three-quarters of the Congo's markets
were suddenly gone. In those eighteen days, many a great
Congo enterprise lost in fact the whole of its markets,
ectorate, reserves, and much more. Companies were,
to speak, decapitated, for in some cases the Brussels office
o a great colonial company would settle general policy
arrange purchases of plant, machinery, equipment and
upphes, finance them, and be entirely responsible for finding
customers. The management in the Congo would simply
produce as efficiently as possible up to capacity, or to a
limit dictated by market fluctuations or marketing agree-
ments, and ship the product to the parent company in
Belgium, who did the rest. ^
abk^^ recovery from such handicaps has been truly remark-
Whole-hearted Co-operation in Allied War Effort
ungrudging spirit in which the
u 1 resources of the Congo have been harnessed to the
Allied war machine was made plain in a speech by the
Goyernor-Generah Monsieur Ryckmans, at the opening of
the Government Council on 4th February, 1941, ffi which
he admitted that certain private interests had been dis-
Anglo-Belgian Finance and Purchase
Agreements of that year. Some were even frankly asking,
k« hi’ negotiators concerned wefe
less able than others, or whether Great Britain were not
generously disposed towards Belgium.
said Monsieur
Ryckmans. Great Britain refused us nothing, either in the
economic or the financial field. If we gainfd no greater
8
benefit, it was because we asked none. If we asked none,
it was because we were not there to sell out at the top price
like mercenaries, but to pool all our resources like good
AUies.”
Great Britain, the Governor-General went on, had thrown
all her wealth into the struggle, and was offering up the
blood of her sons, not only in self-defence, but also to liberate
smaller nations. What the Belgian colonies could give
would be given without haggling, and nothing would be
asked in return — nothing, that is, but victory and freedom!
The Congo had no need of subsidies, and had only asked
for definite arrangements that would enable the country to
plan its economy, for known markets that would allow of
sound budgeting. How could they best aid the Alliance ?
What goods did England most urgently need ? These
should have priority. For the rest, as soon as they knew
what other goods Great Britain could buy from them,
taking into consideration her needs, the available shipping
space, and the allotment of purchases between her own
Colonies and Allied ones, they would organise production
accordingly.
Great Britain’s needs would come first. As to the goods
of which Britain had no need, she would not be asked to
accept them. Other markets would be sought, production
or sales would be restricted, or facilities would be given for
storing non-perishable goods. In extreme cases, subsidies
would be granted from the public funds.
Two Phases of Anglo-Belgian Economic Co-operation
Such is the policy followed by the Belgian Government
with regard to vital war supplies from the Congo, and em-
bodied in four Agreements with the British Government.
Two phases may be distinguished in the practical working
of this policy.
I* B.A.
9
In the first phase :
(a) There are still powerful neutrals in the world whose
currency must be kept at a reasonable level in relation to
Sterling;
(A) Britain still has plentiful supplies of tin, rubber, oil-
seeds, and tungsten ore from the East;
(c) Consequently gold is the most important contribution
the Congo can make to Allied resources. Production of
gold is pushed to the limit at the expense of all other work,
and the metal is deposited in Capetown, boxed ready for
shipment to the United States or elsewhere;
(</) Congo rubber and tin, not being essential to Great
Britain as strategic materials at this stage, are also sent to
America to procure dollars;
(e) Most other Congo products are required only in
quantities well within normal output, and some are not
called for at all.
In the second phase, with the entry of Japan, the United
States, and a number of smaller countries into the war, the
world is near to being entirely divided up between Allies
and enemies, and the problem of supporting Allied currency
in relation to neutral tends to disappear. Cash-and-carry
gives way to Lease-lend. Gold, from being the king of
commodities, suddenly seems almost a drug on the market,
and even respectable economists like Mr. Oscar Hobson
incline towards the heretical opinion (formerly reserved for
Bolshevists, Fabians, Major Douglas, Professor Soddy and
other strangely-assorted company) that gold is a fetish, that
it IS illogical to produce it at all in time of war, and even
that it may never be of any use again except for jewellery
and works of art.
This in itself tends to make gold production take second
place after base metals used in war. When the surrender
or swift fall of French Indo-China, Thailand, British Malaya,
the Dutch East Indies and Burma follows, new sources of
tin, rubber and tungsten become an urgent need. Pro-
duction of these materials is driven to the limit, they have
prior claim on men and equipment, and gold definitely
drops into the background.
These two phases correspond roughly to the two pairs of
Anglo-Belgian agreements signed since the invasion of
Belgium.
The First Anglo-Belgian War Agreements
A Financial and a Purchase Agreement were signed by the
Belgian and British Governments on 21st January, 1941.
Under the Financial Agreement, which is to last for the
duration of the war unless the Purchase Agreements lapse
meanwhile, the rate of exchange for Congolese francs was
fixed, and the Congo became part of the Sterling Area. This
is the zone within which the Treasury allows remittances,
transfer of bills of exchange, sale of non-controlled securities
and various other transactions without special licence.
The Belgian Government on their part undertook to
safeguard the linked currencies by forbidding unnecessary
imports into the Congo, preventing speculation in foreign
exchange, and selling the whole gold production (after
providing for their own official needs) to Great Britain at
current London prices.
Under the Purchase Agreement, the United Kingdom
agreed to import for official or private account all the high-
quality palm oil (not over 6 per cent, of free fatty acid
content) that the Congo could produce, and not less than:
124,000 English tons of copper
20.000 „ „ „ cotton
y,ooo ,, ,, copal
2,500 „ „ „ ground-nuts (peanuts)
15.000 „ „ „ palm kernels
during the twelve months ending 31st August, 1941.
1 1
10
Tin ore was sufficiently covered by existing private con-
tracts, and the British Government promised to consider
the possibihty of maintaining them at the same level on
expiry. The Congo was also to be considered as a source of
sugar supplies.
Prices and Purchase Conditions
The price of palm oil was fixed at £12 per long ton,
inclusive of cost and freight to English port, which compares
with pnces ruling for Nigerian oil at the time when the
agreement was negotiated. There was, however, 'an un-
expected steep rise in market prices shortly after
M other prices were left to the free play of the market,
with the sole and very reasonable proviso that Congo copper
should fetch the same price as Rhodesian, and Congo palm
kernels the same as Nigerian, subject to adjustment for any
ditlerence in quality. ^
With the submarine onslaught on our sea routes at its
height. It was uncertain whether the agreed quantities could
be shipped within the stated time. So that the finances
of the producing companies, weakened in some cases by
severance from the parent company in Belgium, should not
be at the mercy of the tides of war, the British Government
agreed to pay for any balances remaining unshipped after
certain dates, taking over ownership of them where they lay
in the Congo. ^ Without some such solid basis to work upon
production might haye risked serious disorganisation
It was further agreed that the goods purchased under the
Agreement, and any others bought from the Belgian Congo
by the British Goyernment, should enjoy British Empire
of customs duty. This was a recognidon
that the Belgian colonists, who had thrown their whole
strength and resources into the common struggle against
Fascism as readily and unquestioningly as the British, had
thereby earned the same standing and privileges.
13
I
THE MOUNTING TIDE OF CONGO SUPPLIES
TIN
(Exports)
Thou.
Tons
20 . _
5 --
COTTON
(Production)
Thou.
Tons
4S -
40 -
35 -
30 -
25 -
20 -
15 -
10 -
5 -
DIAMONDS,
mainly industrial
(Production)
1941
(12 months
ended
31 Oct.)
COPPER
Minimum British purchases
under Agreements of
Thou,
Tons
150 -
100 1
50 1
JUTE SUBSTITUTES
(production per season in
Leopoldville Province)
Thou.
Tons
7 -
6 -
5 -
4 -
3 -
2 -
I -
193940
13
Purchase Agreement of June i 942 • Growing Importance
OF Congo Supplies
A further Purchase Agreement was signed by the two
Governments on 4th June, 1942. When compared with
the first agreements, it clearly shows the growing importance
of the Belgian Congo as a source of vital supplies for the
Allies after Indo-China, Thailand, Burma, Malaya and the
Dutch East Indies had fallen into enemy hands.
Rubber, wolfram (or tungsten), jute substitutes and coffee
appeared for the first time in the new arrangements.
Minimum copper purchases to be made over a period of
twelve months were raised from 124,000 long tons to 144,000,
and cotton was up by 50 per cent, at 30,000 tons. The
quantity of copal gum remained at 7,000 tons.
In addition to 25,000 tons of high-quality palm oil for
food uses, the Belgian Government took first option on
10,000 tons of lower-grade oil, if available. This quality is
used in the glycerine and explosives industries, and was
imported normally from the Far East.
Many Congo products were by this time in such demand
that Great Britain agreed to take whatever quantities the
colony could spare, without limit. This applies to ground-
nuts, which came in part from China and Burma, and are
needed for making margarine, soap, and cattle foods; to
palm kernels, which have similar uses; and to rubber, tin
ore, and wolfram. The latter, which came mainly from
Burma, Malaya, China and Hong Kong, is an essential
ingredient of self-hardening high-speed tool steels.
The Congo needs Tools . . . and Trinkets
At the same time, the steady increase in the flow of
materials froin the Congo to Britain’s war factories cannot
be kept up without supplies of tools, machinery and spares
in the opposite direction. This is recognised in an important
14
Note appended to the Agreement, in which Mr. Eden
assures the Belgian Foreign Minister, Monsieur Spaak, that
everything possible will be done to meet the Congo’s needs
of “equipment and other supplies essential to the mainten-
ance and increase of production”.
The official phrase “other supplies” and so forth covers
the odd fact that it will be necessary to make and send to the
Congo such unexpected wartime cargoes as bright celluloid
necklaces, flowered cotton prints, and cheap sewing-
machines. These are not a wanton waste of labour and
shipping space; on the contrary, they are literally essential
goods without which the Congolese could never be per-
suaded to produce precious copper, tin, tungsten, and palm
oil for British factories. There is only a small number of
whites in the Congo. Nearly all manual labour in that
tropical climate is necessarily done by negroes, who, in their
native surroundings, will certainly not work for a Kingsley-
Wood post-war credit, or even for cash if there are no bright
ornaments, sugary foods and other treasures to buy with it.
Import Duties and Prices under the Second Agreement
The price of Congo palm oil was brought into line with
Nigerian prices, in accordance with the intention of the
original agreement. Otherwise the various clauses covering
manner of payment, prices, and import duties are un-
changed, the Belgian Government being content to ensure
that their colonists are granted equality of treatment with
British Empire countries in return for their equal efforts
and sacrifices.
15
MILITARY EFFORT
Military Agreement
The fourth Anglo-Belgian pact of this war, signed on the
same day as the second Purchase Agreement, was a military
one which relates to the Belgian troops in England rather
than m the Congo. These forces, incidentally, are equipped
and maintained entirely at the Belgian Government’s own
expense.
The Belgian Campaign in Abyssinia i
The Belgian forces in Africa have, however, already I
played their part in the liberation of Abyssinia from Italian
rule. The campaign was a classical one for strategical
surprise, endurance, and tactical skill.
• Italian armies in East Africa, engaging the British
m the north and south, at least thought themselves safe on the
west, where their short-lived empire was bounded by desert
wastes, a great lake, and perilous mountain tracks.
The Belgian troops nevertheless made the 2,000-mile
journey across Central Africa from Leopoldville, braving
tropical disease and every hardship to take the enemy by
surprise at Saio. Units of the small Congo “Force Publique”
an a.rmed constabulary rather than an army, augmented and
equipped with automatic arms and modern artillery, were
transported m heavy barges 1,000 miles up the Congo from '
Stanley Pool, near Leopoldville, to Aketi. Thence the .•
boats were carried by train and lorry another 800 miles to •
Juba, on the borders of Abyssinia and the Sudan, where they
were again launched on the waters of the White Nile.
By bold attacks, risky patrols in force, and skilful' ruses
in the placing and use of artillery, the Italian garrison were
i6
The Governor-General, M. Ryckmans, visits a Congo Army unit.
One of the forty-eight Spitfires given to the R.A.F. by Belgian Congo
subscribers and manned by Belgian pilots.
16]
Cungo nalive lnml>s Inact'ue river amsiiigs : „ ponUxin bridge.
[Belou') An improvised rafl.
I
given the impression of facing a much superior force. The
mountain fortress of Saio was cut off from supplies by a
flanking movement, brought about unexpectedly along
almost impassable tracks. Finally on the 4th July, 1941,
the commander of the fortress. General Gazzera, with eight
other Italian generals and over six thousand officers and
men, surrendered to General Gilliaert.
Other Congo units had started out from Watsa, in the
north-cast of the colony, and joined the King’s African
Rifles, side by side with whom they stormed and took Asosa.
In all 15,000 Italian and colonial prisoners were taken by
Congo forces numbering scarcely a third of that figure.
Well-equipped Congo Forge stands Ready
The Congo forces have not since been called upon for
active service, but they are kept in full readiness. If the
enemy attempts an African campaign based on Vichy terri-
tory, the Force Publique will be available to strike wherever
Allied strategy demands. They are well provided with
small, powerful American patrol cars, tommy-guns, mortars,
and other modern arms.
A handicap in the Abyssinian fighting, as in so many of
the earlier Allied campaigns of this war, was a lack of air
support. This has now been remedied, and batches of
skilled Belgian pilots continue to flow in from the Union of
South Africa, where they are trained.
Large-scale manoeuvres were held in May last (1942) to
keep the force at fighting pitch, and were pronounced very
successful by the Command.
2* — B.A.
17
FINANCIAL EFFORT
Fighter Funds and War Relief Fund
As in England, so in the Congo, those who are not called
upon to take up arms are giving back a generous part of
their earnings to war funds.
Up to the end of 1941, the “Fonds Colonial des (Euvres de
Guerre” (Colonial War Relief Fund) had reached 26 million
francs (3(^148,000), and the various Fighter Funds over 44
million (3(j‘250,ooo), of which 4 million francs was given
by natives.
When we remember that there are scarcely 30,000 whites
in the Congo, and that the money income of the Congolese is
insignificant, these sums are seen to be remarkable.
At a ceremonial parade held in Leopoldville recently, a
cheque for the quarter of a million sterling was handed to
the British Consul-General for remittance to London. This
sum is going to the purchase of a squadron of forty-eight
Spitfires, which will be manned entirely by Belgian pilots
serving in the R. A.F. Each machine will be known by some
name famous in the history of the Belgian Congo.
Some of these Spitfires have already gone into action, and
the pilot of one of them has just had the distinction of shoot-
ing down a Focke-Wulf 190, the Nazis’ newest and most
dangerous fighter-bomber. This has rarely been en-
countered yet, but has quickly come to be considered a
formidable opponent.
The Colonial War Relief Fund not only helps Belgian
prisoners in Germany, sends food parcels to under-nour-
ished famihes in Belgium, and contributes to the welfare of
Belgian refugees in various countries. A large part of the
Fund goes to Belgium’s allies; for example, the Lord Mayor
has received several cheques from the Fund for assistance to
18
air-raid victims in England. A van for distributing gifts
of clothing has also been presented to the Women’s Volun-
tary Services in London by Congo donors.
AMERICA JOINS IN
Singe war came to the Pacific, the United States are more
and more needing their share of Congo raw materials, and
helping to supply machinery and other essential manu-
factures in return.
The next Congo Trade Agreement will probably be a
three-party one, and at the time of writing (August 1942), the
Belgian Prime Minister, M. Pierlot, the Colonial Minister,
M. de Vleeschauwer, Mr, John Cadbury, of the Ministry of
Food, Mr. Samuel Day, an American Government expert,
and other British and U.S.A. representatives are all in
Leopoldville to plan still further development of the Congo’s
war production and armed forces.
HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF
A Stout Ally in 1914 and 1941
In this story we have just outlined of the Congo’s value as
an ally, history is only repeating itself, though on a larger
scale.
In 1914-18, as the following figures will show, the Congo
mining and smelting industries were very small when com-
pared with their present giant stature, but they made the
same great effort they are making today to expand their
output in order to keep the Allied war machine fully
supplied :
19
Copper
Palm Oil and Palm Kernel Oil
Tons
United Kingdom imports from Belgian Congo in 1914 3,766
„ „ » ,, » » 191613,17s
Belgian Congo agreed minimum supplies to United
Kingdom for 1942 . . . 144,000
Tons
United Kingdom imports from Belgian Congo in 1 9 1 4 150
„ „ „ » » . » 1916 2,900
Belgian Congo agreed minimum supplies to United
Kingdom for 1942 . . • 25,000
Copal
Diamonds [mainly industrial)
Congo production, 1914 . • 24,000 carats
„ ,, 1916 . . 56,300 •„
„ 1940 (provisional
figure) . 10,900,000 „
Congo production.
Gold
1914
1,721 kilogrammes
35
33
1916
33296
33
1941
. 193219
Turning to vegetable products, we see the same great
increase in Congo production during the last war, and the
same immensely higher starting-points from which a similar
ascent is being made today:
Palm Kernels
Tons
United Kingdom imports from Belgian Congo in 1 9 14 412
„ „ „ „ „ ,, 1916 16,328
Belgian Congo anticipated exports to United King-
dom for 1942 .... 50,000
U nited Kingdom imports from Belgian Congo in 1 9 1 4 850
6,200
,, JJ J5 >5 53 3J C7 ’
Belgian Congo agreed minimum suppUes to U.K. for
1942 7,000
In the two years from 1914 to 1916, the Belgian
colonists doubled their output of copper, gold, diamonds
and palm oil, and trebled that of palm kernels. During
the whole course of the first World War they provided Great
Britain and Ireland with more than half their supplies of
copal, and around 5 per cent, of their copper, palm kernels,
palm oil and rubber.
Similarly in the military sphere. General Gilliaert’s forces,
victors of Asosa and Saio in the Abyssinian campaign of
1941, had their forerunners in the Congo armies of 1916,
which did a great deal to put an end to German power in
East Africa. Between April and June of that year they
drove the enemy from the provinces of Ruanda and Urundi,
which were subsequently awarded to Belgium under man-
date of the League of Nations, and are now adding their
quota to the Congo’s supplies of tin, gold, silver, rare-earth
metals, and tropical produce. Subsequently, in naval
operations on Lake Tanganyika, and a brilliant campaign
culminating in the capture of Tabora in September 1916,
they materially helped Great Britain to wrest from Germany
what is now Tanganyika Territory.
THE CONGO’S RESOURCES AND THEIR USE 1
IN WAR I
What are the Congo’s resources in the materials which have ]
so far been called for by the British Government, and to I
what use will they be put ?
Gold
The importance of gold during the first phase of the war
needs no emphasis. By keeping up the rate of sterling on |
the international market, it influenced supplies of every J
finished weapon or raw material of war which Great Britain \
needed to import, and so was itself regarded as a prime 1
weapon. I
The Congo is the twelfth gold-producing country in the I
world. There are more than twenty gold-mining com- |
panics, owning seventy mines, the chief being those of the I
Societe des Mines d’Or de Kilo-Mo to. Several hundred I
million francs are invested in the industry, of which 230 I
million are accounted for by the Kilo-Mo to mines. Approxi- 1
mately half the gold produced in the Congo comes from these
mines (8,700 kilogrammes out of a total of 18,000 in 1939),
and a large part from the Compagnie Miniere des Grands
Lacs Africains (3,100 kilogrammes in 1939). Together
with the Miniere de la Tele company, these mines produce J
about 80 per cent, of the total Congo output. I
Remaining deposits are estimated at 100,000 kilogrammes. |
In peacetime, output of gold was carefully controlled by • J
the directors of the principal Congo companies, to avoid any ]
sudden expansion or contraction that might upset the bullion
market or lead to undesirable speculation on the stock
exchanges. The aim was a moderately but smoothly rising
curve of returns.
In the period of American and Japanese neutrality, the
Congo Government called upon the companies to abandon
this policy completely in favour of maximum output. It
was computed that without importing new plant, output
could be raised by at least 15 per cent., and we may suppose
that this was wholly or partly achieved during 1941, though
no figures have been published.
As already described, the changing world situation has
put an end to the drive for gold, and priority is now given
to tin and copper.
Copper
During the past few years the Congo has supplied about
6 per cent, of the world’s output of copper (production in
1938 and 1939, 124,000 and 120,000 metric tons respectively,
out of world totals of 1,982,000 and 2,200,000). Exports
were 122,000 tons in 1939 and 160,000 tons in 1938.
This is no measure of what the Congo mines can con-
tribute to the Allied war-chest if need be, for production has
been restricted under the Copper Producers’ Association
agreements. In 1939 the potential annual output of Congo
copper was estimated at 230,000 tons.
The entire production of this metal in the Belgian colonies
is controlled by the Union Miniere du Haut Katanga, a
great company with a capital of 300 million francs. Their
main concession is some two hundred miles long by thirty
broad, and still appears to contain over 4^ million tons of
copper deposits. These vast reserves are surpassed only
by those of the Chile company, the Kennecott Corporation
in the United States, and perhaps one or two Rhodesian
producers. The two biggest mines, named Prince Leopold
and Kambove, are equipped with electric mining gear and
automatic decaging machinery. One of the great mechan-
ical navvies will scoop out more than two cubic yards of ore
23
22
at one bite. With the aid of twenty men, it will do the work
of two hundred. The ore goes to several centres in the
Congo itself for treatment.
The works at Jadotville can handle 100,000 tons of ore per
month by the mechanical concentration process, turning out
concentrates with 35 per cent, copper content. There is
also complete washing, drying, crushing and electrolytic
plant for producing pure copper in cathode form, and
electric furnaces specially designed to produce copper-
cobalt-iron alloys direct from an ore in which all three
metals are present. In 1938, 3,600 tons of white cobalt
alloy and 1,400 of red were produced.
Cobalt being of the utmost importance in armament
work for incorporation in high-duty alloys, a special effort
has been made to increase production, and in spite of all
wartime difficulties, new works were recently completed at
Kolwezi, an obscure village which has suddenly become a
modern town. The new smelter is designed to handle up
to 40,000 tons of cobalt-bearing ore per annum.
The richest copper ore is treated at Lubumbashi in water-
jacket furnaces. This plant can also deal with ores im-
pregnated with sulphur.
There is another concentrator at Kipushi, which treats
part of the ore from Prince Leopold workings before passing
it on to Lubumbashi.
The Congo is the fifth copper-producing country in the
world. Fortunately the four leading ones (United States,
Chile, Canada, Rhodesia) are also within the Allied orbit.
In spite of this last fact, there will be a steady call on the
copper resources of the Congo, so vast is the quantity of this
metal consumed in wartime for armaments and all branches
of electrical engineering, including radiolocation and radio
communication with tanks and aircraft. The brass of shell-
cases and the bronze much used in general engineering and
shipbuilding are of course alloys of copper. The importance
24
Modern coimnerdal huUdinos at rsumbura.
A corner of the native city of Kinshasa adjoining Leopoldville.
24]
of it was vividly expressed by Mr. Donald Nelson, head of
the U.S.A. War Production Board:
One type of bomber that is now defending our freedom
requires more than two miles of copper wire to keep it
flying. Another type of plane that we are using requires
500 lb. of copper. A battleship uses 2 million lb. of copper.
If there were no copper, our big guns all over the world
would be silent and helpless.’*
As we have seen, the 1942 Agreement already calls for
16 per cent, more copper from the Congo than the previous
one.
Tin Ore and Tin
Tin has a thousand peacetime uses, chiefly because it is
the only common metal which is both harmless and taste-
less when left in constant contact with foods.
In war it is of prime importance for the production of
bearing metals, and bronze, which enters so largely into
shipbuilding and machinery. Normal users must conse-
quently find substitutes. The vital need for tin in modern
warfare is shown by the lengths to which Germany has gone
in this direction. Thus the tin tubes which led from cellar
to bar in the beer-houses of Germany have all been collected
and replaced by a new alloy steel, which is said to be just as
effective.
Even in normal times the Congo is the sixth producer of
tin in the world, coming after Bolivia, Malaya, the Dutch
East Indies, Nigeria and Siam. This fact becomes doubly
important now that three of these areas are in Japanese
hands.
The output of tin in the Congo is therefore being pushed
to the maximum, with great success, for the country has
already risen from sixth to second rank among world
producers. In theory, the restrictions imposed by inter-
national agreement are still in force, but in fact the limit
3*— B.A. 25
Leopoldville : the port. Shipping at one of the quays.
for the Congo is being increased to keep pace with pro-
duction capacity.
Congo ore takes the form of exceptionally pure cassiterite,
giving nearly three-quarters its weight of refined tin.
Before the war, much ore was exported and little tin, but
ever since Belgium entered the war, the policy has been to
smelt the highest possible proportion of ore on the spot. In
the first year after the invasion, tin was more readily saleable
for dollars than ore. This aspect no longer has to be con-
sidered, but the fact remains that tin naturally requires
much less shipping space than the corresponding quantity
of ore ; also, by smelting in Africa, European workers can
be released for more skilled tasks which could not be en-
trusted at present to Congolese labour.
New smelter plant has been built since May 1940, and
extensions are still being made. The great effort put forth
and its success are strikingly shown in the following figures :
Exports of Tin Bars from the Belgian Congo
Tear
Metric tons
1937 •
2,281
1938 •
1,813
1939 •
1,330
1940 .
• 9,732
September 1940
to October 1941 . . 18,000 (provisional
figure)
Several companies have increased their output by 50 to
60 per cent., achieving this feat in spite of the fact that the
Army has taken 30 to 40 per cent, of their European staff.
It is hoped that the chief company’s plans for raising their
pre-war capacity of 8,000 tons to 20,000 will soon be com-
pleted, and will enable the Congo to double the 1940
figure,
In any case, it seems certain that in 1942 the Congo will
provide one-quarter of the Allies’ total supplies of tin, a very
important contribution towards making good the serious
loss incurred in the Far East.
Tungsten (or Wolfram) Ore
This metal has been largely used for lamp filaments, but
still more important today is its incorporation in self-
hardening high-speed tool steels.
Some 36 per cent, of the world’s tungsten came from
China, now almost cut off from the Allies. Another 20 per
cent, was from Japanese colonies or Japanese-occupied
countries. This is why the British Government has called
for all the tungsten ore the Congo can produce.
In peacetime the output was very small, but it is hoped
that when the question is one of filling a vital need of the
Allied war factories, and not of competing with better-
placed producers, more can be achieved.
Rubber
Trees, creepers and shrubs yielding rubber grow wild in
the Belgian Congo in great profusion. In the early days
of the rubber industry, around 1900, up to 5,000 tons a year
of wild rubber were exported from the Congo.
When later the vast plantations in the Dutch East Indies
and British Malaya flooded the world with more rubber
than the industry could absorb, there was little use for this
wild rubber, and shipments fell to a few score tons a year.
Now that Japan has robbed the Allies of the normal
sources of more than 90 per cent, of the world’s rubber,
every pound of the wild product from the Congo will help
to fill the dangerous gap in Allied supplies. Every ton will
keep forty vehicles on the road which might otherwise be
laid up for lack of tyres. Everyone knows the thousand
27
26
HOW THE BELGIAN CONGO EQUIPS
THE UNITED NATIONS FOR WAR
CONGO RAW MATERIALS ^g've VITAL FOODS & WEAPONS
K>
CO
PALM KERNELS
GROUND NUTS-
PALM OIL
-Vpalm kernel oil— >■
-aground nut oll-
^CATTLE FEED
Soap and candles-
Glycerine
MARGARINE
►COOKING FATS
►SALAD OIL
►FRYING OIL
dles^
PLATINUM (as catalys^t),;^ Sulphuric acid
^Nitric acid
COTTON-
♦ Bronze
Copper wire
Brass
>Solder-
, NITROGLYCERINE— ►CORDITE, etc
^GUNCOTTON
T.N.T.
» ENGINEERING PARTS for war factories
and weapons
SHIPS’ FITTINGS
SERVICES’ RADIO AND RADIOLOCATION^-
ELECTRICAL PLANT for war factories^
SHELL AND CARTRIDH? CASES
Anti-friction metals— ► BEARINGS in WEAPONS AND WAR
FACTORY PLANT
COPAL
LEAD
RUBBER-
protective varnish, insulating varnish > for SHELLS and
Sheathed electric cables
►Insulated wire and cable
SUBMARINE ACCUMULATORS
ACCUMULATORS for AERO ENGINES and
mechanized forces
« COBALT
TUNGSTEN -
MANGANESE-
TITANIUM —
• High-duty steel alloys
DIAMONDS
^rWire-drawing dies
-►Tools for milling and
drilling toughest steel'
GAS MASKS
TYRES for AIRCRAFT, etc.
AIRCRAFT RESCUE BOATS
N.F.S. HOSE
HEAVY WEAPONS and VITAL
MACHINE-TOOLS for WAR
FACTORIES
for WAR FACTORIES
* This use of platinum is now tending to disappear owing to
the same purpose. Other uses of the metal are described m the text.
other uses of rubber in peace and war, some of which are
absolutely vital: gasmasks; N.F.S. and A.R.P. hose and
pumps to -fight fire-bombs; surgical equipment to save the
lives of the wounded; collapsible boats for air rescue; water-
proof canvas ; electricity and radio.
Consequently a great campaign is being conducted to
encourage the natives of the Congo to gather wild rubber,
and the avenues of rubber trees planted round other crops
to give shade are being tapped for the first time.
There are also European-owned plantations of Para
rubber trees covering some 20,000 acres. For some years
before the war, exports of plantation rubber only reached
about 1,000 tons per annum owing to unfavourable markets,
but when working at full pressure the area mentioned
should now yield between 1,500 and 2,000 tons. The out-
put of the trees increases gradually, being trebled between
the first and eighth years of bearing. On the other hand,
it takes five or six years for new plantations to come into
bearing; hence the great importance of wild sources and of
tapping shelter- trees.
A further supply may be obtained by reopening old
plantations which were abandoned when the rubber market
collapsed in 1 922. In many cases these have been swallowed
up in the jungle and there is no record of them, but an
appeal has been made to all planters, missionaries, and
Colonial Government officers to watch for them on their
cross-country journeys, and report any finds to the author-
ities at once.
Plans were fortunately started four years ago to assist
natives in setting out 25,000 acres of rubber plantations of
their own. In case of a protracted war we may therefore
hope to see the Congo later making good anything from
5 to 10 per cent, of the 100,000 tons of rubber for which
England relied, in 1939, on countries now occupied by
Japan.
Cotton
This is grown entirely by natives in their own fields, and
bought by the cotton companies at prices fixed by the
Colonial Government, which encourages planting and owns
large research stations at which the finest Egyptian and
American types of cotton are being acclimatised.
The crop has been steadily increasing over the past
twelve years. In 1939 about 900,000 acres were under
cotton, and some 120,000 tons were picked, giving about
40.000 tons of raw fibre after ginning. In 1940 and 1941 the
figure was up again to 45,227 and 47,188 tons respectively,
another notable success of the Congo’s war effort.
Apart from the innumerable peacetime uses of cotton,
which cannot be altogether abandoned, vast quantities are
required in war for colonial service uniforms and for gun-
cotton, cordite, and similar explosives: hence a campaign
to encourage the natives to grow more, and hence the in-
crease in British purchases from 20,000 to 30,000 tons per
annum already noted.
Copal
Copal is the chief constituent of various kinds of varnish
and “dope.” It is widely used in the armaments industry
itself, and also in waterproofing, in electrical apparatus, and
in the radio industry. The hard, semi-fossilized form of this
gum is found buried deep in the mud brought down by the
waterways at certain seasons of the year. At these times
whole tribes of Congolese make great treks in search of it,
and they succeed in collecting and selling to the traders up to
1 7.000 tons a year. In 1938, 15,000 tons were exported, and
in 1939, 11,000.
So plentiful is this gum that in 1941 a special Export
Regulation Committee was set up in the Congo to avoid
unnecessary shipments that might have taken up space
31
30
needed for other essential goods. Now, however, that
important sources of gums and resins in Malaya have been
temporarily lost to the enemy, Congo resources may be more
fully utilized as stocks fall off.
Ground-nuts
Not everyone who has chewed “peanuts’* or “monkey-
nuts,” as ground-nuts are popularly called, realises that they
are a valuable industrial commodity, of which every part
down to the husk has its uses.
The nuts are first crushed in two series of cold presses,
and the oil drawn off goes to make margarine and substitutes
for olive oil. A further hot pressing gives fats for soap
factories, and what remains is still good for cattle-feeding
cake. Finally, chemical treatment of the husks will give
glucose, acetic acid, and other useful by-products, or where
no plant is available for this they make a good fuel for heat-
ing the presses.
Exports in 1939 amounted to 5,850 tons, and in 1938 to
7,600 tons. Now that Burma is lost, China is almost in-
accessible, and communications with India, the main source,
are strained. Great Britain is to import whatever quantities
the Congo can spare, as already mentioned. As pre-war
exports were far below the amount of the normal crop, which
has been estimated at 80,000 tons, we may hope that these
shipments will be enough to keep margarine production
at a reasonable level.
Palm Kernels and Palm Oil
The red and yellow plum-size fruits of the tall, straight
palm tree grow in great bunches, a thousand or more
together. They have much the same uses as ground-
nuts: the higher-quality oil, usually extracted from the
32
Part of the plant of the tin mines at hohumgwee.
kernel only, is made into margarine, whilst other qualities
derived from the pulp serve for soap factories and the like.
In the soap-making process, glycerine is also obtained
from the oil. As is well known, this is vitally important
in war for making explosives such as nitro-glycenne and
^°stme of the fruit is gathered by natives in virgin forest and
sold to trading stations, but better results are shown by
thinning out natural palm groves and keeping them cleai o
undergrowth. A still heavier crop, lower cropping and
transport costs, and a finer quality of oil are given by
cultivated plantations, regularly manured, which were be-
ginning to oust all primitive methods before the war. Now
that Far Eastern countries producing some hundreds of
thousands of tons of palm fruit and oil annually are in
Tapanesc hands, the Governor of the Congo has appealed fo
every method to be pressed into service to keep up Allied
*^From’iQ35 to 1938 the acreage of plantations of oil palms
in bearing rose from 43>o«o to 70,000 In the same
years, the area of young plantations not yet bearing fruit was
^10,000 and 57,000 acres respectively.
in IQ 38 there were in addition 60,000 acres of improved
natural groves in use. Over 74,000 tons of oil were pro-
duced in all, 18,000 tons being from plantations or improved
srroves and 56,000 from wild fruit.
Exports of palm kernels in 1937-8-9 were 96,000, 89,000,
and 83,000 tons respectively. It is expected that even after
meetii the needs of the Union of South ^fnea and the
Congo itself, at least 50,000 tons a year will be available fo
Great Britain.
Sugar
In the 1938-39 and 1939-40 seasons, Congo production
amounted respectively to 16,961 and 16,169 metric tons
33
(raw value). In 1940-41 it was down to 15,422 tons^ owing
to an unusually dry season.
This output is small in comparison with a world total of
18 to 20 million metric tons yearly, but it has been carefully
controlled in view of international agreements, and there
seems no reason why it could not be rapidly expanded, if
need be, to make good the loss of sugar plantations in the
Pacific war zone. In fact, exports were multiplied four times
over the years 1932-37, and rose by 50 per cent, from 1936
to 1937. According to the last figures to hand, the chief
producing company, the Gompagnie Sucriere Gongolaise
(capital 60 million francs) had only about 8,000 acres under
sugar, out of a concession nine or ten times that area. It takes
rather more than a year for new canes to come into bearing.
The Gompagnie Sucriere has very up-to-date equipment,
including an extensive network of light railways to bring the
canes straight from field to factory. Once the trucks have
been filled with sugar-cane by the plantation labourers, the
whole process of unloading, crushing, drawing off the liquid
sugar, refining, crystallizing and packing is carried out
by modern machinery.
Up to the present, although the British Government
promised to consider using the Gongo as a source of sugar
in the first Purchase Agreement, they have not yet called for
any supplies, no doubt because the United Kingdom’s food
needs could be adequately met by other means, with a more
economical use of shipping. In accordance with the policy
announced by Monsieur Ryckmans, the Gongo makes no
complaint of this, but has set about finding other uses for the
sugar. More sugar foods are being given to the Gongolese
labourers, who prize them and will work the more readily
for the war effort, and new markets have been found in
Rhodesia, British West Africa, and Free-French Equatorial
Africa, incidentally relieving the strain on other supply-lines
of these colonies.
Sugar can of course be used as a source of glycerine for
(explosives, if supplies of vegetable oils fall short.
Goffee
Nearly 160,000 acres are planted with coffee, and about
25.000 tons a year can be produced, or thirty to forty times
the small quantity that used to come from the Dutch East
Indies.
Jute Substitutes
Urena Lobata and Punga are grown by natives of the
Gongo on their own plantations, covering some 23,000 acres.
These plants give fibres closely resembling jute, and can be
used to make sandbags, ropes, hawsers etc. in the same way.
About 8,000 tons a year can be produced.
This amount, though small in comparison with the
190.000 tons per annum normally imported from India, is
likely to be a welcome asset under present conditions, as
shown by the Order which came into force in Great Britain
on the 20th July, 1942, making it an offence to throw away
or destroy any rope or string.
The exact quantity of coffee and of jute substitutes to be
sent to England under the Agreement of June 1942 has been
left to be fixed in the light of developments.
GONGO PRODUGTS NOT GOVERED BY THE
ANGLO-BELGIAN AGREEMENTS
Our survey of the Financial Agreement and the two Pur-
chase Agreements gave a first glimpse of the products that the
Gongo can contribute to the war effort, but there are very
many others which for one reason or another were not
35
34
.revered by the Agreements, often because supplies are
cowrea y private enterprise.
'''fn'SmI cases, of course, other sources, more economic
\ at hand have so far proved adequate,
or ncare shipping space could not be spared, or
"th°Africa needed the whole supply available m the Congo .
Whlfthe spreading and intensiheation of the war since
D^finber 1941, the following resources may also be of vital
importance to the Allied cause.
Other Mines
The country is particularly rich in minerals and mining
me cou r . j.jstrv The commercial value of mining
ha“lS„ es.im*d a, a.370 million franca
St .Sllim M O'' of '“‘“S' >1«»
,, 00* million francs in 1936. j on
In 1038 there were 71 gold m«es, 57 diamond, 29 tin, 10
^ also cobalt, coal, iron, radium and salt mines,
copper, producing these minerals also
^ smSerbut very finable quantities of rare-earth
^ \,nd Other scarce substances which are essential in war,
matufaemte of radio compoaoB used in military com-
• and in radiolocation.
Conso is the world’s leading producer of industrial
j- rid radium and cobalt, and, as mentioned above in
tnnection with the Anglo-Belgian Agreements, holds second
place for tin, fifth for copper, and twelfth for gold.
Diamonds
More than four-fifths of the Congo output consists of
• ^^?frial diamonds. These are a key requirement of
moSrn larfare, which the Nads have continu^ly striven
ToSain from South Americaby air, and the Ministry of
36
Economic Warfare has been at equal pains to intercept. A
constant supply is needed by armament factories for drilling
and milliug machines. In the form of fine wire- rawing
dies, they arc also vital to the radio and electrical industry.
Everything has, therefore, been done to increase ' e
Congo output of diamonds, which was 4,926,000 carats m
1937, 7,206,000 in 1938, and 8,361,000 in 1939. u„u,i.
"^In 1940 it was brought up to 10,900,000 carats, a notable
achievement in face of the handicaps of that year, repre-
senting 80 per cent, of world output by weight. It may be
revealed that the work of the diamond mines in I94i was
still more successful, though the figure is not for pubheat om
Antwerp was the great centre for cutting and mounting
both industrial and gem stones, and the sudden loss of t
town paralysed the market for some months, which
production largely accumulated in idle stoc m e ‘
In June 1941, however, agreements were made under wl
the wholo of the Congo output of diamonds is sent to Londo
for sale and distribution. In fact, all diamon s excep
British Guiana and Brazilian, or over 90 per cent., are now
sold through one central organisation.
With the exception of a few hundred carats the whole
Congo output is due to the Societe Internationale Forestiere
et Mini^re (“Forminiere” for short) and its associa
companies.
Manganese
Ma.g,„,s, B again . product of the Union <>“
Haut Katanga, mentioned above under the hea*ng of
“Copper.” It is of prime importance m war for produci g
high-duty ferro-alloys. Output
1937 and 8,000 in 1938. The Union Minieres CobaH ha
also beon referred to above. Other f
vast undertaking has practically a monopo y in le ong
lead, zinc, palladium, and radio-active ores.
37
Palladium
Lead
Lead. — ^4,625 tons were produced from Congo ore in 1938.
Large supplies are needed for covering electric cables, for
small-arms ammunition, and for the plates of accumulators.
Besides their well-known uses in petrol engines and in radio,
which are at the heart of mechanised warfare, accumulators
provide the motive power of submarines when under water.
Over 850,000 metric tons of lead per annum can be pro-
duced in the United States and the British Empire. This,
however, is only about equal to peacetime consumption in
the U.S.A. and United Kingdom alone. In spite of the fact
that a further 200,000 tons a year from Mexico is no doubt
largely available to the Allies, and that only about 80,000
tons are lost through the fall of Burma, a shortage is begin-
ning to be felt in England. This is evident from the drastic
restrictions just placed on the use of lead in buildings (July
1942), which totally forbid the use of lead in most kinds of
plumbing, rainwater pipes, gutters, cisterns and damp-proof
courses. The shortage is perhaps due to the difficulty of
bringing lead from Australia, the source of about half the
Empire output, while the struggle with Japan is at its height.
Under these conditions a contribution from the Congo,
even if only of four or five thousand tons, should be very
helpful.
Zing
Zinc is of course a constituent of brass, of which shell and
cartridge cases are made. Production of concentrates in the
Congo was 11,251 tons in 1938. In that year 8,279 tons of
spelter were smelted from Congo concentrates, out of world
production of i ,589,000 tons. About half the world’s output
comes from the American continent, the United States
being the largest producer. It may therefore not be
necessary to draw on the Congo zinc mines, and will prob-
ably be preferable to devote all energies to other metals.
38
Palladium is used to make accurate, permanent graduation
scales for scientific instruments, and is more than ever needed
in wartime. In 1937, 389 kilogrammes were produced
from Congo ore.
Radio-active Ores
In 1937, 1,052 tons were exported. The average annual
Radium production from these ores amounted in peacetime
to 15 grammes, but unfortunately there is no plant in the
Congo itself capable of extracting the radium. This process
was carried out at Oolen, near Antwerp.
Many other Congo mining industries were in the same
difficulty. The steps taken to overcome it are, of course, to
some extent secret at present, but it may be stated that these
ores are being shipped to the United States, which imported
1,071 long tons of uranium ore from the Congo in 1940,
valued at over 2 million dollars.
Platinum
Platinum was in great demand during the first World War
as a catalyst for speeding the process of manufacturing
sulphuric acid and nitric acid, which are the base of most
high explosives, including guncotton, t.n.t., nitroglycerine
and cordite.
This use is now declining, owing to the discovery that
fused silica will serve the same purpose; but platinum is still
indispensable for contact points in electrical apparatus, for
laboratory vessels and astronomical instruments, and in the
construction of pyrometers used in controlling various steel
processes. Its importance in wartime is therefore obvious.
It is mined in the Congo by the Comite National du Kivu,
the Mines d’Or de Kindu, and once again the Union
Miniere du Haut Katanga. In recent years, from 50 to
39
100 kilogrammes of the metal have been produced annually
from the Union Miniere’s ores alone.
Silver
Production in the Congo in 1938 amounted to 97,091
kilogrammes of fine silver, plus 23 kilogrammes from the
adjacent Belgian-mandated territory of Ruanda-Urundi.
Expressed in ounces, this would be roughly 3 I million, on a
world production of 263 million fine ounces.
Now that faith in gold as the only possible basis for
sound finance has been shaken, silver is less than ever valued
as a backing for currency. In the United States the New
Deal bimetallist law has not been repealed, but it is begin-
ning to be nullified in practice. Mr. Morgenthau has been
allowed to deliver silver from Treasury stocks for making
“bus bars”, the heavy connecting rods linking up units of
electrical plant in various industries, which are usually made
of copper. We may expect that the tendency to put silver
to industrial uses will increase, and that Congo silver will be
pressed into service in the same way, or more probably to
replace tin in solders and bearing metals.
Rare-earth Metals
Mohium {or Columbium) and Tantalum are widely used for
the filaments of electric lamps. They are mined by the
Societe Miniere du Maniema, and by the “Geomines”
company at Manono. About 130 tons of tantalum were
produced in 1938.
The alloy-steel industry is trying to cut down the con-
sumption of tungsten (see p. 27) by using sintered carbides
of tungsten and tantalum.
In 1937 the “Minetain” company produced 7J tons of
columbite (mixed niobium-titanium ore). Of this ore, 61
tons were exported in 1939.
40
Leopoldville Textile Factories Company — a
Titanium^ Thorium^ Cerium^ Yttrium and Lanthanum are
mined by the Cie. Mini^re du Congo Beige. These rare-
rarth metals have varied and important uses. Cerium, for
example, forms part of the so-called “flints” for gas lighters,
(he need of which every housewife has felt with the dis-
appearance of Belgian and Swedish matches from the shops.
It is also an ingredient of gas mantles, and a derivative is
valuable in medicine. This is a far from exhaustive account
of its usefulness.
Titanium is normally used to make pigments of various
colours, but in wartime it can be used in alloys to eke out
other steel-hardening metals.
Rutile with a 94 per cent, titanium content is also found
on the concession of the Miniere des Grands Lacs. The
“Somuki” company has deposits of Bastnaesite, a source of
cerium and lanthanum.
Non-mining Industries
Besides these great primary industries, the Congo has its
intermediate and manufacturing ones. In a tropical,
colonial country these are of course relatively undeveloped,
manufactured goods in great variety being easily imported
in time of peace.
Only chemicals, textiles, and their allied industries call
for special mention.
The following were some of the production figures for
these in 1938:
Sulphuric acid .
13,100 tons
Oils treated by hydrolysis .
1,650 „
Glycerine ....
50 »
Gheddite ....
407 ..
Soap ....
• 5.000 „
Cloth ....
. 12,500,000 yards
41
The chemicals are produced by the Societe G^nerale
Industrielle et Chimique du Katanga (“Sogechim”). Their
works at Jadotville include a sulphuric-acid plant with a
capacity of 30,000 tons yearly, and also produce fatty acids
(3,000 tons annual capacity in 1936), sodium chlorate,
caustic soda, and hydrochloric acid.
By working at full pressure, this company should be able
to supply all the mining explosives needed in the Congo, and
possibly part of the ammunition for the colonial army as
well, thus releasing valuable shipping space for other goods.
Small quantities of chemicals are supplied to other parts
of Africa, but they are mainly for local consumption.
The textile industry is making an important and direct
contribution to the war effort by providing uniform material,
bandages, dressings, cotton-wool, sheeting, and tent canvas
for the Belgian Colonial Army and Free French Forces,
which are not only garrisoning their own territories but
have played a full part in the Abyssinian and Libyan cam-
paigns. For this purpose the only mill, which is at Leopold-
ville, has been extended, and has been made almost selfj
sufficient by setting up machine-shops to cast, finish and
repair loom parts. Both mills and machine-shops are to
be further enlarged to cope with a growing demand for
military equipment from British colonies in .^rica also.
The piece-goods are sent to workshops in Free French
territory to be made up. , • • u
In peacetime the only other secondary industries in the
Congo are those concerned with preparatory treatment of
raw materials (cotton ginning, extraction of oil from seeds
and kernels, etc.), or small works catering for purely local
needs.
New secondary industries are beginning to make their
appearance under the pressure of war. Essentials which are
now almost unobtainable are paper, wood-pulp and matches,
formerly imported from Belgium, Scandinavia and Japan.
42
A company has now been formed with the object of
manufacturing three million boxes of matches a year. They
have an option on the machinery needed, and will have
State help in the form of duty-free imports and special terms
I'or rail and river freight in the Congo. Two species of tree
found in the Colony but not yet put to any commercial
use are suitable for making matches — the baobab and the
pokopoko.
Trials are also being made of local timber and papyrus
from the tropical swamps in the manufacture of pulp. It is
lioped to supply pulp to South Africa, as well as to a packing-
paper factory now being erected in Leopoldville.
Finally, some of the weapons for the Colonial Army are
now manufactured on the spot.
Animal and Vegetable Wealth not Covered by the
Anglo-Belgian Agreements
The chief wealth of the Congo, after the mines, lies of
course in its crops and animal life.
Several hundred tons of hides and skins, and from a few
tons up to two hundred tons of ivory, according to the state
of the market, are exported in a year.
The following vegetable products not already mentioned
in connection with the Anglo-Belgian Agreements are
exported at the rate of more than a thousand tons per
annum : Timber (47,000 tons in 1939), maize (20,000 tons
in 1939), cattle-feed cakes (3,000 tons in 1939), raw cocoa,
fresh fruit, rice, tapioca flour, cottonseed oil and sesame.
The total production of most of these is unrecorded, but
in 1938 it was certainly higher than the following :
Rice .
Maize
Tapioca flour
46.000 metric tons
68.000 5 , ,,
33.000 „ „
43
Development of these natural resources often progresses
at a great rate, giving good prospects of rapid action to
replace sources of supply closed by the war in the Pacific.
Thus from 1936 to 1937 alone output of timber doubled and
the maize crop trebled. In 1939 maize was a principal
export from French Indo-China to this country, and timber
from Thailand.
The area of forest being worked for timber in 1938 was
250,000 acres, which produced over 2 million cubic feet of
logs and nearly half a million cubic feet of sawn wood.
Natural reserves are practically inexhaustible, the area
mentioned being less than one-tenth of i per cent, of the vast
forest regions of the Congo. Nevertheless, a far-sighted
afforestation policy is in force.
The only obstacle to increasing the timber supplies is that
where customers require seasoned wood or sawn scantling
sizes it is difficult to expand the kiln-drying plant and the
sawmills quickly enough. In 1941 equipment was in-
sufficient to cope with the demand from the Union of South
Africa alone. Some supplies were received in return from
the Union’s factories, but these do not manufacture the
finned tubing used in drying-kilns, which has to be brought
from Europe or America. In spite of all such difficulties
the “Agrifor” company (Societe Agricole et Forestiere du
Mayumbe) have gone ahead with extensions to their plant,
and the position is improving.
CONGO CO-OPERATION WITH SOUTH
AFRICA
Mutual help between the Union and the Congo has
developed greatly since the war, each supplying the other
with produce that normally came from more distant sources
44
now less accessible. There are regular sailings between
Boma and Capetown, and special arrangements have been
made for transporting timber across the Union by rail, with
very satisfactory results. In the Congo itself, a great deal of
limber is still carried by elephants.
The Congo provides the Union with timber, palm oil,
( ocoa beans and bananas, and receives South African
manufactured goods in return.
POTENTIAL RESOURCES OF THE CONGO IN A
LONG WAR
So far we have spoken only of resources already being
worked on a fairly extensive commercial scale.
Potential wealth must also be taken into account in the
balance-sheet of Allied war resources, even where it can only
be tapped by costly and difficult means calling for a long-
range programme of development. The need for heroic
expedients and the possibility of a long war have been greatly
increased by the Pacific conflict, and no likely source of
vital supplies must be overlooked.
In the vegetable kingdom, the potentialities of the Congo
are almost unlimited. At different altitudes and in different
latitudes the most astonishing variety is or can be grown.
Few are the useful plants that have not been raised in the
Congo either for local use or experimentally. Everything
from the wheat and vegetables of temperate zones to the
exotic pineapple is part of the local food supply.
Self-sufficiency in Food
To decrease the call on imported canned goods from
Europe and the U.S.A., a great effort has been made to
improve supplies of fresh food. By co-operative methods of
45
production and transport, the amount of garden and dairy
produce sent from the Kivu district to the equatorial zone
was increased from 20 tons per month in 1941 to 60 tons
per month early in 1942.
Real Silk
Plans were set going in 1938 to provide 1,500 natives with
their own mulberry plantations, and huts for breeding silk-
worms. It is very fortunate that these efforts are now
beginning to give results, for silk is essential in modern war-
fare, and the principal suppliers were, of course, China and
Japan. It is used in manufacturing parachutes, parachute
flares, insulated wire for radio windings, and for many other
important purposes.
In the latter half of 1941, i J tons of cocoons were brought
in, and in view of the broad basis laid down for this new
industry four years ago, it is hoped that this figure can soon
be multiplied twenty times over.
Parachutes woven from Congo silk are already being used
by the R.A.F.
The silk is of such high quality that first-grade “gut’’ for
surgical stitching can be produced. In 1941, over 200,000
lengths hf this were made, and i million is the target set for
the current year (1942).
Quinine
Cinchona bark, the raw material of quinine, is grown on
1,500 acres by the Synquinac Company, and four years ago
subsidies of several hundred pounds were granted to extend
plantations of this vital medicinal plant in various districts.
Quinine is being extracted locally. During 1943, new
groves will yield bark, and the Congo will be able to meet all
its own needs without calling on Allied supplies strained by
the loss of the usual source, Java. Further, it is expected
46
I hat in the following year, the Congo will be able to supply
all Africa with quinine to combat malaria.
Soya
Soya, a product of Japan with a hundred uses, grows very
i cadily in the Congo and will yield 2^ tons per acre in
European hands, or about half that amount under native
cultivation with primitive methods. It enters into mar-
garine, chocolate, sauces, other composite foods, vegetable
casein, glue, artificial textiles, cattle feed and varnish.
Tung Oil
Tung oil, also called China Wood oil, can be replaced by
copal for many purposes, but if necessary the oil itself can
also be produced in the Congo. This is already being done
on a small scale.
Tung oil is used in heat-proof varnishes, quick-drying
enamels, brake-bands, and insulating materials for the
electrical industry, among many other things. One chief
source of this oil was Hong Kong, lost for the time being to
the enemy, and the other China, whose communications
with her Allies are now precarious.
Graphite
Graphite, an indispensable high-speed lubricant, was
mainly imported from Germany, Italy, Norway, Japan and
Madagascar. The recovery of the last source will give us
back about a quarter of the normal peacetime supplies of
1 6,000 tons per annum, but the route to be traversed is much
longer than from the Congo. It will no doubt be necessary
to investigate the Congo deposits thoroughly without delay.
Concessions have been granted to two companies, but un-
47
fortunately reports on quality so far received are not very
encouraging.
Oil has been found on the shores of Lakes Edward and
Albert and in the Mayumbe region, but has apparently not
given sufficiently plain promise of returns to tempt capital.
Possibly in view of the loss of at least 50 million gallons a year
normally obtained from the East Indies and Malaya, it will
be worth while to make trial borings in the Congo.
GENERAL ECONOMIC TRENDS
State Regulation of Trade and Industry
In spite of the vastly different economic structures of the
tropical, colonial Congo and of highly industrialised Eng-
land, the general trend of economic development during the
war and the economic problems arising have been alike in
several respects.
As in England and elsewhere, the war has brought with
it a great increase in Government regulation of industry and
trade, facilitated no doubt in the Congo by the wide per-
sonal powers of the Governor-General, which are similar
to those of the head of a British Grown Colony, and by the
fact that there was already a certain amount of “mixed
economy,’’ that is to say enterprises in which the Govern-
ment held at least a half-share of the capital and had
nominal, though not always effective, control.
As in England, too, there is a tendency to regard some of
the new spheres of State or semi-State control as the basis of
a post-war economic policy.
Again, there has been the same controversy between
public and some official opinion on the one side, and
Army headquarters on the other, as to what proportions
4.8
man-power should be, firstly, in the fighting line and,
secondly, in production to keep the line supplied and
(‘quipped.
This controversy has been all the more acute in the Belgian
( ase, because after the fall of the homeland the Army was
necessarily small, and because Congo production com-
prises vital basic materials of first importance to the Allied
war economy as a whole. There was thus a tendency on
the one side to regard civilian production as unquestionably
more important than the small army could possibly be, and
on the other to make it a point of honour to whip up as large
a new army as possible from all available sources, of which
the Congo must naturally be the first.
Whatever the truth of the matter, it must be acknowledged
that all protagonists had solely in view the furtherance of the
Mlied cause.
The services of Belgian Embassies, Legations, and Con-
sulates in all the free countries of the world have now been
enlisted in an intensive campaign to register and recruit
new technical staff for Congo industry. We may hope that
this will shortly solve the problem and begin to send output
of strategic materials up to new heights.
Government Control of Quality
Uniform High-grade Supplies for British War Factories
Government intervention in the Congo has been of the
most varied kinds.
First there is control of quality, prohibiting export of
inferior produce and preventing any misuse of trade terms
such as “Copal Lac,” which have come to be regarded as a
guarantee of high quality. This is only an extension of a
principle accepted in the Congo long before the war. For
more than ten years it has been illegal, for example, to
export adulterated rubber, or plantation rubber containing
49
\ I lit .1 \ i :i I ;i \ r 0 ,i
•I i 1 / -
I I \ Y
more than 15 per cent, in all by weight of water, i^on-
coagulated latex, stickage, and vegetable impurities.
There is now a tendency, however, for this kind of coritrol
to widen into a virtual prohibition of new enterprise in
certain fields, an innovation which would be open to stern
criticism from the late-surviving but very vocal econortiists
of the strict laisser-faire school. The same virtual pro-
hibition occurs in England, in a hundred-and-one tre^^^jog
where it is impossible to open a new business because supply-
quotas are only granted on the basis of a percentage of pre-
war turnover.
The following are some of the quality controls set up since
1939, which help to ensure a uniform supply of first-grade
goods for England’s war factories and for some of the
essential consumer-goods industries of the Union of South
Africa, including the furniture industry.
Logs of limba wood may only be exported if they come
up to standard length and girth, and are practically free
from clefts, irregularities, wormholes, etc.
Sawn wood must be clean-cut on the square, and of at
least the length stated. It may be longer, unless consisting
of packing-case boards or other work calling for correct
sizes. Planed or finished work must also be of exactly the
correct size, and there must again be practically no
clefts, wormholes, sap wood, etc. Further, no export con-
signment is allowed to go forward without a signed declara-
tion showing whether the wood is seasoned, kiln-dried, or
chemically treated. The same Order lays down the names
to be applied to various species of Congo timber.
Decorticated ground-nuts are inspected by the Customs at
the frontiers, and may not be exported unless they are ijni-
form in colour, are free from insects and mould, and contain
less than 8 per cent, humidity. There are also limits of 2 per
cent, for foreign substances, 15 per cent, for considerably
damaged nuts, and 30 per cent, for slightly damaged Oues.
50
1 I ;• 1; ’i
. . \ \ i. It
I I :
Produce Offices
< iovernment Action to Improve Quality and Promote Sales
A Coffee Office has been set up to improve quality and
increase sales. It is run by a Committee consisting of eight
(^vernment officials (mostly agricultural research experts)
together with four representatives of the growers. All those
genuinely connected with the coffee business may be mem-
bers of the Office. No coffee may be exported without a
licence from the Office, which may impose any condition it
wishes, subject to the right of any aggrieved party to appeal
to the Governor-General.
The organisation of these “Offices” is of some interest,
rhe object is in each case to improve quality and output and
lo increase sales of some wild or cultivated product. The
Offices so far set up have been given powers to actually
engage in trade and industry, which would probably have
been jealously denied to such a- semi-State advisory and
development body in most countries. Apparently there was
some apprehension on this point in the Congo too, for the
general Legislative Order of 15th October, 1940, which lays
down the status of all such Offices, prohibits them from
trading or engaging in industry unless expressly authorised
to do so.
They are financed by Government loans or subsidies,
which may, however, be recouped by taxes imposed for the
jnirpose on the trade concerned, and collected by the Office
itself.
The Offices have power to forbid exports of poor-quality
goods. They may also administer funds for combating
plant diseases or pests, and grant bonuses to members for
excellence of quality or packing.
There is also a Pyrethrum Office, pyrethrum being a
j)lant (feverfew) of which the flowers are used in making
insecticides.
51
I. I •. M. ■: 1: > » ■
\ > / J I
This Office collects a tax for inspecting pyrethrum flowers
before export. Inspection is compulsory, and no flowers
may be shipped unless they contain at least i*2 per cent, of
pyrethrine and come up to various other standards of quality.
Produce Commissions
Price-fixing and Control of Exports
For several other products there are bodies known as
Commissions which from the overseas buyer’s point of view
have much the same satisfactory influence on quality as the
Produce Offices, but have sometimes wider and sometimes
narrower powers.
The Urena and Punga (jute substitutes) Commission, for
example, fixes minimum export prices. Like the Offices,
this Commission controls quality of exports and charges a
tax upon inspection, to recoup expenses. It is similarly
formed of both Government officials and representatives of
the trade.
Fine, silky jute-type fibres, or long ones, must be sorted
out from inferior or short ones. A maximum of lo per cent,
humidity is allowed, and no foreign substance whatever.
The Palm Kernel Commission, on the other hand,
amounts to little more than a Government contract to two
large firms to purchase from natives or middlemen the whole
of the kernels to be supplied to the British Government.
The Palm Oil Commission licenses exports of this product,
and does not allow any oil registering over 8*5 per cent, of
free fatty acid to pass, unless on some special grounds. In
order to reserve shipping space for the best-quality oils,
export is subject to a quota based on 1939 figures, except in
the case of oil from cultivated plantations of selected palms,
which may be shipped without limit.
A bonus of 20 francs per ton is paid for each decreasing
degree of acidity below 8-5 per cent., and a further special
bonus for oil exported to Great Britain which sho\^^
Ilian 5*2 per cent, acidity, less than *5 per cent, watc^^
slight traces only of any impurity.
Exports to Great Britain, U.S.A., the Rhodesias a^^
Union of South Africa may only be made by firms y^Yiich
exported at least 250 tons of their own oil in 1939, or
plantations of selected palms producing that amount^ v
syndicates of exporters who jointly fulfil these condit
Maize exports from the chief maize-growing
may only be made through the Syndicat d’lnitiat^^^
Exportateurs du Lomami-Kasai, which is empowere^
minimum prices to be paid to the native growers.
A Copal Commission, consisting of a nominee
Governor-General and four representatives of the
allots quota licences for exports of this gum. Only
who exported 150 tons or more in 1939, or groups of
who jointly did so, may now engage in the trade. Th^
the terms “Copal du Lac Leopold II” or “Copal |g
restricted to traders around the lake and in certai^ well-
defined neighbouring districts, who have long made i^ ^
to refuse to buy any but scraped, washed and sort^^
from the native collectors. All other Congo copal
described as “Copal Equateur.”
Export Pools
Next there is compulsory pooling of produce to
most effective use of labour, transport, etc., and to ^^sure a
still closer control over the quality and flow of expo^^^
is given by the Offices and Commission.
The Export Pools, or “Groupements,” were forme(|
initiative of the chief firms concerned, but whei^ some
traders did not think it to their interest to join the
Governor-General has given the schemes official backing
and made membership obligatory.
.53
Thus ground-nuts may only be sold through a Pool
managed by the Syndicat dTnitiative des Exportateurs du
Lomami-Kasai.
There is also a Rubber Export Pool, and a Cotton Pool
organised by the Leopoldville Cotton Growers’ Committee.
Analogy with Export Groups in England
Like the Export Groups in England, these Pools are
viewed in some circles not merely as a wartime expedient
to economise labour and transport temporarily while the
national interest imperatively demands it, but as the embryo
of a new, rational system of post-war overseas trade.
Monsieur Jennen, Economic Adviser to the Belgian
Ministry of the Colonies, has had the courage to pronounce
unequivocally in their favour, and hopes to see pools for all
Congo produce, which would organise all sales abroad, the
producer having nothing more to do than produce of his
best and deliver to the Pool. The Pool would have a stand-
ard contract, long-term price agreements, standardized
packing, and carefully graded goods. Each Pool would,
moreover, have a single selling agency in each buying centre,
in place of a number of competing small commission agents
each pushing the wares of one company.
It has been suggested that the Pools should also become
j oint buying agencies, to provide producers with tools and
other equipment and supplies obtained in bulk direct from
the manufacturers.
Control of Mining Output
It is extremely difficult for England and America to spare
much plant and to ship it safely to the Congo at present;
also, the small supply of skilled supervisors and technicians
in the Colony has been depleted by the demands of the
Belgian Army.
54
Consequently there is also some direct control of mimng
production, to ensure that plant and skilled staff are
promptly switched from one industry or mine to another
;is war developments or local circumstances require. We
have already seen that war policy first called for a production
drive in the gold mines, but that after the Pacific losses and
the full alliance with America, tin suddenly became far
more important. ^
Such turns in the situation will now be swiftly met by
(exercising the powers of the Direction de la Production
Miniere de Guerre (War Mining Production Board), com-
monly known as D.P.M.G.
The Board can transfer engineers to whatever work be-
comes most urgent for the purposes of war, and can order
that plant and machinery be used in common by two or
more producers if need be.
Monsieur Lienart, a Provincial Commissioner of the
Congo, has been appointed head of the Board, and will be
assisted by a technical adviser and secretarial staff. He
has authority to call on the services not only of all the
technical experts on the Congo Government staff,
of the employees of private companies and semi-private
bodies such as the Upper Congo-Great Lakes Railway,
the Katanga Special Committee, and the Kivu National
Committee.
Monsieur Lienart has declared that all private interests
must take second place; total participation in the war until
final victory comes before all else.
Labour Legislation
Key Men must Remain at their Posts
A measure similar to the Essential Work Orders in Eng-
land is the decree of the Governor- General ordering a
state of “Civilian Mobilisation.” Under this, practically
55
expirm. — o,
extended for the d« adult able-bodied
Also for the duration > ^ ^ grow-
natives can be compelled ^ produce in addition to the
ing, harvesting, or ^native-owned plantatbns
r‘'-tS£cr2 of 5th December, i933)- Wag« are, of
St?paidtr any compulsory service of this kind.
CONCLUSION: TOTAL WAR
It is fair to “ettrS^ IgtLst Nazism mlrits
Congo’s ^ ener and resources in every
^
words of the Governor-General in his broadcast on
the Belgian Nation^Day tte invaded Bel-
“Since the loth M y 9d ’ j. make war, and
gium, the Congo has o^ Qo^go makes war both in the
lives only for ^ spite of having given the
field of battle and 1 g^pg made by
best of our men to the A J> P producing and
death, sickness, and ^sk,
delivering more successfu y whatever can strike a
whatever can increase their strength, wn
blow at the enemy. oVioii rp<!tore to our Sovereign
“ “'‘“’/rS’C tld SLuUied."
the flag entrusted to us, tree, p
56
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